Analysis No. 5 · November 2026 · Nelson Viegas

Why can’t I find a home to live in?

Portugal is not short of homes. It is short of homes where people want to live.

I gathered 25 years of data on prices, credit, construction, immigration, tourism and the Census, from Statistics Portugal (INE), Banco de Portugal, the BIS and academic studies, and crossed them region by region. No single factor explains the rise on its own. What explains why all of them passed into the price is the housing that stopped being built where demand is concentrated.

0.56

New homes for each new household in Grande Lisboa, Península de Setúbal, Grande Porto and the Algarve, between 2011 and 2020; in the rest of the country it was 3.19

INE, Official; calculation
7,148

New homes completed in Portugal in 2015; in 2002 there had been 125,708

INE, Official
157

Municipalities where the price per square metre more than doubled between 2017 and 2025

Banco de Portugal, Official
15 years

Of average earnings to pay for 90 m² in the Algarve; nationally it is 8.5 years

INE and GEP, Official; calculation

101 sources · 10 chapters · 1 mechanism · about an hour and a half of reading

A note before we begin

Nelson Viegas, in a blue suit and light-blue shirt, in an office with natural light

The first four analyses looked at business-to-business sales and at consumer goods. This one changes market and goes to the home, the biggest purchase most families make in their lives.

It is a sector I know from the inside. I worked very actively in real estate, mainly in real-estate marketing and sales. Until 2013, Portuguese estate agents and property finders had to prove their professional capacity to renew the estate agency licence (AMI) and the property finder registration with the InCI, the sector regulator. There were two ways to do it: an exam or continuing-training credits. My training courses in real-estate marketing and sales gave those credits.

I wanted to understand why homes became so expensive, without starting from a ready-made answer. I let the data speak first, block by block, from 2000 to 2025, and the thesis appeared at the end. It is not the one you hear most often.

I wrote with families who want to buy or rent a home in mind. At the end, I bring together what all this means for them today.

As in the previous analyses, when the official sources disagree, I show the numbers side by side instead of picking one.

Nelson ViegasFounder of Superior Training Technology

Summary

Ten conclusions

In chapter order. Each one leads to the evidence.

  1. 01 · 2000–2004

    With 100,000 new homes a year, cheap credit did not push prices up.

    Between 2001 and 2007 the real price fell 9%, while families took on debt and Spain almost doubled its own.

    See the evidence →
  2. 02 · 2005–2009

    Credit hit its peak and prices stood still.

    19.6 billion euros of new lending in 2007 and a first wave of immigration, with no real price rise. Construction had been falling since 2003.

    See the evidence →
  3. 03 · 2010–2014

    The troika shut off credit and planted what came next.

    New lending fell 90% and the real price ended 34% below its peak. At the same time came golden visas, the new rent law and the short-term rental regime.

    See the evidence →
  4. 04 · 2015–2019

    Demand came back and found construction at a standstill.

    In 2015, 7,148 new homes were completed, 5.7% of the 2002 peak. Prices had been rising since the end of 2013.

    See the evidence →
  5. 05 · Short-term rentals

    Tourism revived the old quarters and took their homes.

    In Santa Maria Maior, 28% fewer family homes in a decade. Nationally, short-term rentals are about 2% of homes.

    See the evidence →
  6. 06 · Money from abroad

    Money from abroad opened the cycle; those speeding it up today live here.

    Non-residents accounted for 15.7% of the value of sales in 2014 and 8.2% in 2025, the year of the biggest price rise.

    See the evidence →
  7. 07 · 2020–2025

    Every shock at once, and all of them passed into the price.

    Immigration, interest rates, record lending and support for young buyers: in 2025 prices rose 17.6%, the highest in the series.

    See the evidence →
  8. 08 · Geography

    The housing shortage has an address.

    Lisbon, Setúbal, Porto and the Algarve had 74% of the decade's new households and 34% of its new homes. In the rest of the country, three homes were built for each new household.

    See the evidence →
  9. 09 · Contradictions

    The official numbers do not add up, and that changes conclusions.

    How many homes are built, how many immigrants there are, how many homes are missing: the official sources disagree on eleven key quantities.

    See the evidence →
  10. 10 · Synthesis

    No factor explains everything; stalled supply explains why all of them passed through.

    Credit, tourism, foreign buyers and immigration weighed at different moments. With the construction of the early 2000s, none of them would have had the same effect.

    See the evidence →

The spine of the analysis

The homes that were not built where they were needed

The mechanism has three parts, and every chapter comes back to them. The first is new supply: it fell from 2003 and never recovered where demand is concentrated. The second is the waves of demand, which arrived one after another: tourists, investors from abroad, immigrants, young people with a public guarantee. The third is geography: each wave passes first into the price of the centre and then spreads outwards. When there was construction, the waves of demand did not pass into the price. Since it stopped, all of them have.

The thesis, in one sentence

Portugal is not short of homes: it is short of homes where people want to live. It stopped building in those places from 2003 and, when demand came back in 2013, every wave that arrived (tourists, investors, immigrants, young people with a public guarantee) passed entirely into the price, first in the centre and then in waves outwards.

The five pieces of evidence behind it

  1. Before and after construction. With more than 100,000 new homes a year, plentiful credit did not push prices up; with fewer than 10,000, every demand shock passed through1, 14.
  2. The timeline. Construction began to fall ten years before prices rose, and the rise began in 2013, before the short-term rental boom, negative interest rates and the second wave of immigration1, 7.
  3. Geography. The shortage is local: vacant homes are mostly where demand is not, and the rise spreads from the centre to the periphery12, 47, 73.
  4. The nature of the rise. Prices and rents moving together, expectations in line with reality and credit following rather than pushing: this is scarcity, not a bubble73.
  5. The change of buyer. Buyers from abroad weighed more at the start (15.7% of the value of sales in 2014); the recent acceleration comes from people who live in Portugal (8.2% in 2025)69. The engine changed; the stalled supply stayed.

What the data does not support

  • That it is a credit bubble: credit followed prices, it did not lead them73.
  • That it is foreigners or golden visas: they weighed at the top end and at the start, and their share fell while prices accelerated62, 67, 69.
  • That it is short-term rentals: decisive in the historic centres, secondary nationally (about 2% of the housing stock)12, 40.
  • That it is only immigration: between 2005 and 2009 the foreign population rose 65% and real prices fell1, 5.

Each of these factors is real; none works without stalled supply. In this analysis, they come in as the waves that passed into the price.

Where each trend begins

Today's price rise began in the third quarter of 2013, but the forces behind it began at different dates, some much earlier. Construction began to fall in 2003; wage stagnation is documented from 2002; the first wave of immigration was in 2006; short-term rentals entered the law in 2008 and exploded in 2014. The chart shows the curve of real prices in Portugal and Spain; the table puts the starting dates side by side.

Real house prices, Portugal and Spain

Real house prices, Portugal and SpainReal index, 2010 = 100, annual averages from 2000 to 2025. Portugal falls until 2013 and rises afterwards; Spain rises until 2007, falls until 2013 and recovers less.406080100120140160180200200020052010201520202025PortugalSpain
Real index (2010 = 100), annual average of the four quarters. Source: BIS via FRED 1, 3; own calculation.

In real terms, Portugal fell 9% between 2001 and 2007 while Spain almost doubled. Since the 2013 trough, Portugal has risen 129% and is 53% above its 2001 peak. Spain has risen 49% from its trough and is still 15% below its 2007 peak1, 3calculation.

The starting dates

TrendBeginsStarting signalSource
Stagnation of real wages2002Average real base wage +5.2% in 16 years, from 2002 to 201723
Fall in new construction2003After the 2002 peak; in 2013 the index stood at 22.9 (2000 = 100)7
Fall in real prices2001Real peak in Q4 20001
Household debt1990s, accelerating 2000–2006From 86% to 124% of disposable income20
First wave of immigration2006+57,000 foreign residents in one year, +65% from 2005 to 20095
Peak of new lending200719.6 billion euros, highest in the series18
Short-term rentals in the law2008Legal category created; almost no registrations until 2013Decree-Law 39/200835, 86
Growing share of renovation2008From 20.4% of completed works to a third in 20157, 8
Tax benefits for new residents2009Non-Habitual Resident regimeDecree-Law 249/200987
Golden visasOctober 201211,628 up to January 202326
Liberalisation of rents and eviction2012–2013National Rental Office, about 3,000 evictions a year41
Price riseQ3 2013Real trough in Q2 2013 (80.0)1
Short-term rental boom2014Own regime; 14,127 registrations at the end of 2014, 77,053 in October 201830
Recovery of lending20143.9 billion, almost double 201317
Recovery of permits2015From 8,618 new homes permitted (2015) to 24,905 (2019)9
Negative interest rates2016First negative annual average of 12-month Euribor4
Second wave of immigration2016, accelerating in 2018From 383,759 (2015) to 1,543,697 (2024)5, 6
Rising interest rates2022From −0.49% (2021) to 3.87% (2023)4
Foreign residents in mortgage lending2021From 7.38% to 13.56% of the amount (2021–2025)45

Two dates deserve attention. Construction began to fall ten years before prices began to rise: when demand came back in 2013, the capacity to build had already gone. And the price rise began before the short-term rental boom, negative interest rates and the second wave of immigration: these factors sped up a rise that was already under way.

Before you read

How a home’s price is measured

The same decade of prices can be told as a rise of 164%, 175%, 180% or almost 240%. All the sums can be right: they measure different things. Before reading the blocks, it helps to know which ruler is being used.

The four rulers available

  • INE House Price Index (since 2009). Follows the same homes over time, from deeds of sale. It is the official ruler, but it only starts in 2009.
  • BIS series for Portugal (since 1988). The Bank for International Settlements joins national series into one. From 2009 it matches the INE index; before that it rests on other national sources, mainly valuations. There is a nominal version and a real one, adjusted for inflation1, 2. It is the only ruler that covers the 25 years of this study.
  • Bank valuation (INE). The value the bank gives the home when it grants the loan. It measures homes bought with a mortgage, not the whole market.
  • Median price per square metre of sales (INE). The middle value of all sales in the period. In 2025 it was €2,076/m², +16.8% on 2024Observador/INE, source 54. It changes when the type of homes sold changes, even if prices do not.

A note on the BIS series before 2009: the source itself changes method that year. The idea that Portugal had no bubble in the 2000s rests partly on valuations, not on sales. It is a weakness to keep in mind, not a reason to set the series aside: the 2014 Banco de Portugal study that compared Portugal and Spain also rested on bank valuations and reached the same conclusionsecondary.

One decade, four numbers

Who says itHow much it rosePeriod and ruler
Euronews (June 2026), with Global Property Guide data27almost 240%"last decade", ruler not stated
idealista, from INE180%"last decade" to 2025secondary
BIS, Q4 2015 to Q4 20252175%nominal, quarter on quartercalculation
BIS, 2015 average to 2025 average2164%nominal, annual average on annual averagecalculation
BIS, 2015 average to 2025 average1114%real, adjusted for inflationcalculation

The difference between 164% and 240% is not a rounding error. It comes from the starting point (the 2013 trough gives bigger numbers than 2015), from the ruler (index or median) and from using annual averages or quarters. In this analysis, every figure for a rise says where it starts and which ruler it uses.

Nominal and real

Between 2000 and 2025 the nominal index rose 160%, from 94.4 to 245.8 (base 2010 = 100). The real index rose 55%, from 120.1 to 186.11, 2calculation. The difference is accumulated inflation. At two moments the distinction changes the story:

  • 2001–2007: in nominal terms prices rose about 8%; in real terms they fell 9%. Anyone who bought in 2001 and sold in 2007 made money on paper and lost purchasing power.
  • 2022: the nominal index rose 12.6%, the real one only 4.5%, because implied inflation was 7.8%. The "record" rise of 2022 was, to a large extent, inflation.

In this analysis, the blocks use the real index to compare periods and the nominal one to talk about what people paid.

To read it better

Glossary

The technical terms that appear in the analysis, explained in a few words.

Nominal index
measures how home prices change in current euros, without adjusting for inflation. If the index goes from 100 to 160, the same homes cost, on average, 60% more.
Real index
the same index after adjusting for inflation. It shows whether homes became more expensive than everything else. This analysis uses base 2010 = 100.
Euribor
the interest rate at which euro-area banks lend money to each other. Most mortgages in Portugal pay Euribor plus a bank margin (the spread): when Euribor rises, the monthly payment rises.
Golden visa
a residence permit for investment, created in 2012 for non-EU citizens who invested in Portugal, for example by buying a property worth at least 500,000 euros. The home-purchase route ended in 2023.
Debt-service ratio
the share of monthly income that goes on the mortgage payment or the rent. A payment of 700 euros on an income of 2,000 euros is a ratio of 35%. Banco de Portugal recommends it does not exceed 45%.
Non-resident
a buyer whose tax residence is outside Portugal, whatever their nationality. A foreigner who lives and pays taxes in Portugal counts as a resident.
Short-term rental (alojamento local)
a home or room rented to tourists for short periods, with its own registration. It does not count as permanent housing.
NUTS
the division of the territory used by INE and the European Union in statistics. NUTS II are large regions, such as the Algarve; NUTS III are sub-regions, such as Grande Lisboa or Península de Setúbal. The boundaries changed in 2002, 2013 and 2024, so numbers from different years do not always compare.
Median
the middle value when all cases are put in order. If half the homes sold cost less than 2,076 euros per square metre and half cost more, the median is 2,076. Unlike the average, it is not pulled up by a handful of very expensive homes.
INE
Statistics Portugal (Instituto Nacional de Estatística), the official body that produces Portugal's statistics: Census, prices, construction and rents.
PORDATA
a public database run by the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation that brings together statistical series from several official sources, mainly INE.
Troika
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which between 2011 and 2014 lent money to Portugal in exchange for a programme of cuts and reforms.
1

Chapter 1 · 2000–2004

With 100,000 new homes a year, cheap credit did not push prices up.

At the start of the euro, Portugal had falling interest rates, easy credit and the biggest construction machine in its recent history. Even so, the real price of homes fell 6% between 2001 and 20041calculation. This is the block that contradicts the idea that low interest rates always push prices up.

The numbers for the block

Variable20002001200220032004Source
Nominal index (2010 = 100)94.499.4100.1101.2101.92calculation
Real index (2010 = 100)120.1121.3117.9115.4113.51calculation
Real change+4.8%+1.0%−2.8%−2.1%−1.6%1calculation
12-month Euribor, annual average4.78%4.08%3.49%2.34%2.27%4calculation
Foreign population with a residence permit207,587223,997238,929249,995263,3225
Monthly minimum wage (€)318.2334.2348.0356.6365.622

Construction: the peak of the century

Between 2000 and 2004, an average of about 104,000 new homes were completed each year14. The peak was in 2002: 125,708 homes completed in new construction for family housing, according to the INE series in PORDATAsecondary. INE itself, in 2014, put that year at 113.4 on an index where 2000 equals 1007.

The 2021 Census gives the measure of what remained: 529,510 of the existing buildings (14.8%) were built between 2001 and 2010. Those built between 2011 and 2021 number 110,784, only 3.1%12. One decade made five times more buildings than the next.

Credit: families take on debt

At the end of 2000, household debt was worth 86% of disposable income. At the end of 2006 it was worth 124%20. The 12-month Euribor fell from 4.78% in 2000 to 2.27% in 20044calculation, and banks lengthened loan terms between 1995 and 200620.

Subsidised credit, which subsidised interest on home purchases, ended for new contracts with Law 16-A/200225exact date of entry into force to be confirmed in the Diário da República. The price series shows no break linked to that end: the real fall had been under way since 2001.

Why there was no bubble

Banco de Portugal wrote in 2007 that "there is no evidence of overvaluation of prices in the residential property market"20. The data for this block points to three reasons, which reinforce each other:

  1. Supply responded in quantity, not in price. With more than 100,000 new homes a year, every euro of new lending found a new home.
  2. Wages did not keep up. The average real base wage went from €879 in 2002 to €925 in 2017, +5.2% in 16 years23. With income not growing, borrowing hit its limit early.
  3. Immigration was moderate. The foreign population rose 27% in four years, but from a base of 208,000 people5calculation.

Spain, next door

In the same block, the real price in Spain rose 55%, from the 2000 average to the 2004 average3calculation. The two countries had the same euro, the same Euribor and banks lending easily. The difference lay elsewhere. Spain had its construction peak in 2006, with 658,510 homes completed, at the end of the bubble; the Portuguese peak was in 2002, before real prices began to fall85.

Where the trends of this block begin

  • The real price peak: Q4 2000 (index 122.0). The real price only returned to that level in Q4 2019 (122.5), 19 years later1.
  • The fall in construction: begins after 2002, six years before the financial crisis.
  • The stagnation of real wages: documented from 200223.
2

Chapter 2 · 2005–2009

Credit hit its peak and prices stood still.

New mortgage lending reached the highest level in the series in 2007, at 19.6 billion euros18, 19. In the same year, the real price of homes fell 1.9%1calculation. This block also contains a wave of immigration that hardly appears in today's narratives.

The numbers for the block

Variable20052006200720082009Source
Nominal index (2010 = 100)104.2106.3106.9100.299.22calculation
Real index (2010 = 100)113.5112.4110.3100.7100.61calculation
Real change0.0%−1.0%−1.9%−8.7%−0.1%1calculation
12-month Euribor, annual average2.33%3.44%4.45%4.81%1.62%4calculation
Foreign population with a residence permit274,631332,137401,612436,020451,7425
Dwellings completed, all types of works———68,33655,0977
Dwellings permitted, all types of works———55,60635,5857
Monthly minimum wage (€)374.7385.9403.0426.0450.022

The credit peak

The 19.6 billion euros of 2007 are the highest in Banco de Portugal's series of new loans, which starts in 200318. Household debt was already at 124% of disposable income at the end of 200620. Measured as a percentage of GDP, household debt peaked in 2009, at 91%21.

The 12-month Euribor more than doubled between 2005 and 2008, from 2.33% to 4.81%4calculation. Since most loans were variable-rate (still 80.2% in November 202218), monthly payments rose without families having borrowed more. In 2009, with the crisis, Euribor fell to 1.62%.

The first wave of immigration

Between 2005 and 2009, the foreign population with a residence permit rose from 274,631 to 451,742 people, 65% more in four years5calculation. From 2006 to 2007 alone, 69,000 more arrived. The peak of this wave, 451,742 in 2009, was only exceeded again in 20185.

In these years real prices fell. It is a fact that weighs in today's debate on immigration and housing: a 65% rise in the foreign population coincided with falling prices, at a time when tens of thousands of homes were being built each year.

A caveat: part of the 2006–2008 jump may come from legal changes in the way people were counted (the 2007 foreigners law changed the types of permit), and not only from new arrivals. It is flaggedto be confirmed in the SEF reports for 2006 to 2008.

Construction already falling

In 2008, 68,336 dwellings of all types of works were completed, and in 2009, 55,097. Permits fell faster: from 55,606 to 35,5857. For 2007, Banco de Portugal gives 67,500 new homes completed16. For 2008, the INE series in PORDATA gives 59,256 dwellings completed in new construction for family housingsecondary. The two 2008 numbers do not contradict each other: the first includes extensions, alterations and reconstructions.

Construction halved in six years, and it fell before the crisis. When credit shut down in 2008, the machine was already slowing.

The 2008 shock, side by side with Spain

In 2008 the real price fell 8.7% in Portugal1calculation. In Spain, between the 2007 and 2009 averages, it fell about 11%3calculation. In this first year of crisis, the two countries fell in a similar way. The difference came afterwards: the Spanish fall continued until 2013 and was much deeper (next block).

In Ireland, according to Eurostat, prices fell 50% from the peak at the end of 200751.

Policies of the block

  • New Urban Lease Regime (2006): the first attempt to update old rents, in phasesto be confirmed in the Diário da República.
  • Short-term rentals enter the law (2008): this is the year the legal category of short-term rental appears, according to the framework cited in studies on Lisbondiploma to be confirmed. Registrations in Santa Maria Maior are practically zero until 200935.
  • Non-Habitual Resident regime (2009): a tax benefit for new residents; I did not find the number of beneficiaries per year.

Where the trends of this block begin

  • The first wave of immigration: begins in 20065.
  • The peak of new lending: 200718.
  • The rise in monthly payments through interest rates: 2005 to 20084.
  • Short-term rentals in the law: 2008, still with no weight.
3

Chapter 3 · 2010–2014

The troika shut off credit and planted what came next.

Between 2010 and 2013 the real price fell 19%, and the trough came in Q2 20131calculation. In the same block, almost all the rules that shaped the following decade were approved: golden visas, a new rent law, the urban renovation regime, a dedicated regime for short-term rentals. This is the block in which today's trends are born.

The numbers for the block

Variable20102011201220132014Source
Nominal index (2010 = 100)100.095.188.486.790.42calculation
Real index (2010 = 100)100.091.883.081.284.91calculation
Real change−0.6%−8.2%−9.6%−2.1%+4.5%1calculation
12-month Euribor, annual average1.35%2.01%1.11%0.54%0.48%4calculation
Mortgage lending granted (€ million)4,7101,8472,0322,3723,91217calculation: monthly average × 12
Home sales129,950−28.0%−18.4%79,775—7, 8
Dwellings completed, all types of works41,36832,37934,35726,242—7
Dwellings permitted, all types of works31,39424,68717,96710,519—7
Foreign population with a residence permit443,055434,708414,610398,268390,1135
Monthly minimum wage (€)47548548548548522

Credit shuts down

Mortgage lending granted fell from 19.6 billion euros in 2007 to about 1.8 to 2.0 billion in 2011 and 201217, 19. That is a fall of about 90%. Bank valuations of homes, the first step in a mortgage, fell from about 125,000 in 2009 to about 31,600 in 20137.

Sales followed: 129,950 in 2010, the highest in the series until 2016, and 79,775 in 20137, 8. The share of existing homes in sales rose from 63.8% to 73.4%7. New homes almost stopped being sold, because they almost stopped being built.

People leave

The foreign population fell 14% between 2009 and 2014, from 451,742 to 390,1135calculation. Estimates of Portuguese emigration point to between 100,000 and 135,000 people a year and negative net migration in every year of the troikato be confirmed with INE. The minimum wage was frozen at 485 euros from 2011 to 201422, and the average real wage fell from 201123.

Credit shut down, incomes falling and people leaving: no factor was pulling prices up, and none did.

Construction collapses, renovation gains weight

Dwellings permitted fell to a third in four years: from 31,394 in 2010 to 10,519 in 20137. In 2013 only 7,286 new homes for family housing were permitted7.

At the same time, the share of renovation in completed buildings rose: 20.4% in 2008, 25.6% in 2011, 26.8% in 2012 and 29.1% in 20137, 8. In number, renovation did not grow: 6,954 renovated buildings were completed in 2012 and 6,715 in 20137. The share rose because new construction fell more. It is the first clue to the phenomenon the chapter on short-term rentals develops.

The legal seeds

YearMeasureWhat changedVerification status
2009Non-Habitual Resident regimeTax benefit for people who become resident in PortugalDiploma to be confirmed
2012Revision of urban leases (Law 31/2012)Updating of old rents and faster eviction, with the National Rental Office from 2013Law to be confirmed; evictions:41
2012Revision of the legal regime for urban renovation (Law 32/2012)Simplifies renovation in urban renovation areasDiploma located, content to be summarised
Oct. 2012Residence Permit for Investment (golden visas)Residence in exchange for buying property from 500,000 euros, among other routesTotals:26
2014Exceptional regime for urban renovation (DL 53/2014)Exempts renovation works from some technical rules designed for new constructionDiploma located
2014Dedicated short-term rental regime (DL 128/2014, in force in Q3)Short-term rental stops being a residual categoryDate:38

The National Rental Office recorded 38,834 evictions since 2013, a little over three thousand a year on average41. The Directorate-General for the Administration of Justice warns that the real number may be lower, because the handover of the property is not always reported41.

Short-term rentals take off

In Santa Maria Maior, the parish of Alfama, Baixa and Castelo, new short-term rental registrations were 21 in 2010, 9 in 2011, 42 in 2012, 43 in 2013 and 243 in 201435. Across the country, at the end of 2014, there were 14,127 registrations30. In Lisbon, Airbnb listings were about 2,000 in 201436. The jump begins exactly in the year of the new regime.

Spain: the fall Portugal did not have

From the peak (Q3 2007) to the trough (Q4 2013), the real price in Spain fell 44.5%3calculation. In Portugal, from Q1 2007 to the trough in Q2 2013, it fell 28.7%1calculation. Spain fell more because it had risen more: the Spanish real price almost doubled between 2000 and 2007, and the Portuguese one fell.

Where the trends of this block begin

  • The price rise: begins in Q3 2013 (real 80.8, after 80.0 in the previous quarter)1.
  • The recovery of lending: 2014, with 3.9 billion euros, almost double 201317calculation.
  • Short-term rentals: 2014, with the dedicated regime.
  • The share of renovation: rising since 2008, because new construction fell.
  • Foreign demand with a legal benefit: 2009 (non-habitual residents) and 2012 (golden visas).
4

Chapter 4 · 2015–2019

Demand came back and found construction at a standstill.

Between 2013 and 2019 the real price rose 47%, with almost zero inflation and negative Euribor1, 4calculation. New construction stayed at its lowest of the century. Short-term rental registrations went from 24,000 to more than 90,000, and non-resident buyers reached 13% of the value of sales. It is the block in which the most new factors come in at once.

The numbers for the block

Variable20152016201720182019Source
Nominal index (2010 = 100)93.299.8109.0120.2132.22calculation
Nominal change+3.1%+7.1%+9.2%+10.3%+10.0%2calculation
Real change+2.5%+6.5%+7.8%+9.2%+9.6%1calculation
12-month Euribor, annual average0.17%−0.03%−0.15%−0.17%−0.22%4calculation
Mortgage lending granted (€ million)5,5167,7269,56810,26810,33117
Home sales—127,106153,292178,691about 181,4008; 2017–2018secondary; 20199calculation
New homes permitted (family housing)8,61811,811—21,89624,9059, 10
Cumulative short-term rental registrations, year end24,34335,60654,50377,053 (to 15 Oct.)about 91,60030; 2019secondary
Foreign population with a residence permit383,759392,969416,682477,472588,9765
Monthly minimum wage (€)50553055758060022

How many homes were built? It depends who is counting

For the new homes completed in this block, the official sources do not give the same number:

YearNumberSource
2015about 6,600Implied by INE in 2017: 7,256 in 2016, 9.8% more than in 20158calculation
20157,148INE, cited by Observador13
20157,817INE, Construction and Housing Statistics 20209
20178,213INE, Construction and Housing Statistics 202210
201912,954INE via PORDATAsecondary
201913,092INE, Construction and Housing Statistics 20209
2015–2019, averageabout 9,000 a year+Liberdade14

The likely explanation lies in the method. For some years INE has estimated completed works with a regression model based on the deadline in the permit, and it revises earlier years11. Each edition of the report gives slightly different numbers for the same year. Whatever the version, 2015 and 2016 are the years with the fewest new homes completed this century: fewer than 8,000, against more than 100,000 a year in the early 2000s.

Permits recovered earlier than completions: new homes permitted tripled from 8,618 in 2015 to 24,905 in 20199. A permitted home takes years to be ready, so the new supply only arrived in the next block.

Renovation at its peak

Share of renovation20152016201720182019Source
In buildings permitted30.7%29.8%26.4%25.1%24.0%9
In buildings completed33.2% to 33.6%29.5% to 31.4%27.7%24.9%25.3%8, 9, 10

The highest share of renovation in completed works was in 2015, with a third of the total. Even the share itself varies between INE editions (33.2% or 33.6% for 2015). In Porto, reconstructions per 100 new constructions went from 8.8 in 2011–2013 to 31 in 2014–2016. In Lisbon they reached 12.8 in 2013–20158. The centres of both cities were rebuilt in this block.

Short-term rentals multiply

Short-term rental registrations went from 14,127 at the end of 2014 to 77,053 in October 201830. At that date, the municipality of Lisbon had 15,881 registrations, Porto 6,972 and Albufeira 6,54230. In Lisbon, Airbnb listings went from about 2,000 in 2014 to 15,700 in 2018, 76% of them entire homes36.

The effect on prices was not the same everywhere. The Nova SBE study finds significant effects in Lisbon and Porto and no effect in the Algarve or the rest of the country38. In Lisbon and Porto, short-term rentals took homes that could have been permanent housing. The next chapter deals with this in detail.

The foreign investor

  • Golden visas: 11,628 permits between October 2012 and January 2023, 10,668 of them through property purchase, with about 6 billion euros in real estate26. On average, a little over a thousand a year.
  • Non-resident buyers (2019): 19,520 properties, 3.44 billion euros, 8.5% of the number and 13.3% of the value of sales9. That is about 176,000 euros per propertycalculation.
  • Rents in Lisbon: rose 110% between 2013 and 2017, according to Cocola-Gant and Gago36.
  • Hotels in Lisbon: went from 105 in 2008 to 218 in 201836.

The second wave of immigration begins

The foreign population starts rising again from 2016 and accelerates in 2018: from 416,682 in 2017 to 588,976 in 2019, 41% more in two years5calculation. For 2017, AIMA gives 421,8026, 5,120 more than the PORDATA series. The difference is small, but it shows that even the starting point of this wave depends on the source.

Policies of the block

  • Banco de Portugal macroprudential measure (July 2018): limits on the loan-to-value ratio, the debt-service ratio and the maturityvalues to be confirmed in the source. Real prices rose 9.2% in 2018 and 9.6% in 20191calculation: the measure did not stop the rise. Lending granted levelled off at 10.3 billion euros17.
  • Short-term rental containment zones in Lisbon (end of 2018): Estrela, Misericórdia, Santo António, Santa Maria Maior and São Vicente32.

Where the trends of this block begin

  • Negative interest rates: 2016, the first year with a negative average 12-month Euribor4.
  • The second wave of immigration: begins in 2016 and accelerates in 20185.
  • Permits for new homes: recover from 20159.
  • The fall in the share of renovation: begins in 2016, when new construction grows again8, 9.

New homes completed in Portugal, 2000–2025

New homes completed in Portugal, 2000–2025Number of homes completed in new construction for family housing, per year. Peak of 125,708 in 2002, low of 7,148 in 2015.0k35k70k105k140k2000: 112,61220002001: 115,1542002: 125,7082003: 92,5082004: 74,2612005: 76,12320052006: 68,7642007: 67,4632008: 59,2562009: 47,9152010: 35,44220102011: 26,3822012: 19,6842013: 12,7512014: 8,3132015: 7,14820152016: 7,9092017: 8,2132018: 10,7512019: 12,9542020: 16,92320202021: 19,9262022: 21,0472023: 22,2802024: 24,6662025: 27,3012025125,7087,14827,301
Dwellings completed in new construction for family housing. Source: INE, indicator 0000076 76; 2021–2025 provisional.
5

Chapter 5 · Short-term rentals

Tourism revived the old quarters and took their homes.

In the historic centres of Lisbon and Porto, tourism did two things at once: it paid for the restoration of run-down buildings and it took those homes out of permanent housing. In Santa Maria Maior, between the 2011 and 2021 Censuses, 28% of family homes and 22% of residents disappeared31, 34. In the country as a whole, short-term rentals are too small to explain the price rise. The data supports the hypothesis in the neighbourhoods where the phenomenon was concentrated, and not outside them.

The hypothesis

When tourism grows and short-term rentals become profitable, vacant or run-down buildings become worth restoring. Restoration is good for the neighbourhood: façades, roofs, structures. But the restored flats go into the tourist circuit and leave the housing market. The neighbourhood ends up restored and with fewer homes for those who want to live there.

The hypothesis has two parts that can be tested separately: (1) short-term rentals drove renovation; (2) the renovated homes left permanent housing.

Part 1: did short-term rentals drive renovation?

The evidence in favour is consistent, from different sources.

  • The starting point was decay. A dissertation at Técnico (2016) chose Santa Maria Maior because it had "a high number of vacant, derelict buildings in poor condition". It concluded that "short-term rentals make an important and positive contribution to urban renovation in Lisbon"37.
  • Buildings in poor condition decreased. In Lisbon's historic centre, buildings in poor condition fell 5.8% between 2012 and 2016. The asking price for properties to renovate rose 65% between 2014 and 201535.
  • In Alfama, renovation went to tourism. In a building-by-building survey of the Rua dos Remédios area, 21 buildings with 130 units were renovated between 2015 and 2017. Twelve went entirely into short-term rental36.
  • In Porto, reconstruction soared. Reconstructions per 100 new constructions went from 8.8 in 2011–2013 to 31 in 2014–20168.
  • When short-term rentals were curbed, works fell. A study by the Directorate-General for the Economy (April 2026) compared the Lisbon parishes that entered containment in 2018 with the others, from 2009 to 2024. In the curbed parishes, applications for works permits fell by about 21 a year per parish in one model, and about 35 in another. In a third, staggered model, the effect stops being statistically significant. The author himself says it is not possible to fully "attest a causal link"32.
  • Economists saw the same incentive. The Nova SBE study on Airbnb writes that the price rise "created incentives" to renovate and convert homes in the historic centres. It did not measure this directly38.

The evidence against is mostly about scale. Renovation also rose as a national share, from 20.4% of completed works in 2008 to a third in 20157, 8, and that increase began before short-term rentals. That share rose mainly because new construction fell. Renovation driven by tourism is a historic-centre phenomenon, not a national one.

Part 2: did the renovated homes leave housing?

In Lisbon's central neighbourhoods, the data's answer is yes.

ParishPopulation 2011Population 2021Family dwellings 2011 → 2021Source
Santa Maria Maior12,8229,997 (−22%)10,776 → 7,698 (−28%)34; change −27.8% in31
Misericórdia13,0449,645 (−26%)10,555 → 8,660 (−18%)34; −17.6% in31
São Vicente——−6.2%31
Santo António——−2.6%31
Municipality of Lisbon——−1.9%31

There is a detail of method that strengthens the hypothesis: the Census does not count short-term rentals as family dwellings31. A home that became a short-term rental can simply drop out of the count. The 28% fall in Santa Maria Maior is consistent with this, although the Census cannot prove how many of those homes are short-term rentals today.

The Alfama study adds the mechanism36:

  • Short-term rentals went from 16% to 25% of homes in the area studied in one year (235 of 945 flats, in December 2016).
  • 99% were entire flats; 78% belonged to investors who bought to rent out.
  • In two years, 150 flats were bought; only one by a new resident.
  • 36 tenants were forced out of 27 flats; 18 of those flats became short-term rentals and 9 were left empty.
  • Over six months of 2017 tracking Idealista, there were almost never homes for long-term rent in the area.

How much short-term rentals weigh in each parish: six numbers

The short-term rental ratio in Santa Maria Maior is the clearest example of how the same fact gives very different numbers:

RatioValueHow it is calculatedSource
Official (September 2022)52%Short-term rentals over homes in the 2011 Census31
2011 base (City Council)51.7%2022 short-term rentals over homes in the 2011 Census33
Without hostels, 2021 base60.7%4,669 short-term rentals over homes in the 2021 Census31
City Council, 2021 base71.3%2022 short-term rentals over homes in the 2021 Census33
With weighted hostels77.1%Each hostel counts as several units31
Residents' association (2026)69 per 100 occupied homesNational register crossed with the 2021 Census39

The change of base makes sense: as the 2021 Census counted fewer homes, the same number of short-term rentals weighs more. It is the phenomenon itself changing the ruler that measures it. In Misericórdia, the ratio goes from 39% to 51.8% depending on the formula31.

The effect on prices and rents

  • Nova SBE, working version (2019): each additional percentage point of Airbnb share is associated with prices 4.5% higher and rents 2.26% higher. In the treated areas, prices rose 34% and rents 10.9% relative to the control areas, up to 2016. The effects are significant in Lisbon and Porto and not in the rest of the country, and the effect on rents is not robust in the urban-only sample38.
  • The same research, published version (2021): according to secondary summaries, +3.7% in prices per percentage point at municipal level and +3.2% in the parishes of Lisbon and Porto, with no significant effect on long-term rentsto be confirmed in the published article. The two versions do not say the same about rents.
  • Suspension of new registrations in Lisbon: a study cited by the Ministry of the Economy estimates an 8.6% fall in the prices of homes sold in the first zones with suspended registrations31.

The evidence against: scale and return

  1. Nationally, short-term rentals are small. In 2025 there were about 125,000 registrations, more than 40,000 of them inactive40. The 2021 Census counted 5,970,677 homes12. Even with all registrations, that is about 2% of the stockcalculation. And many short-term rentals in the Algarve and the islands were never permanent housing.
  2. When short-term rentals leave, the homes do not come back. In 2026 Lisbon has 37% fewer short-term rentals than in 2025 (11,704). In Santa Maria Maior, only 11% of buildings with a cancelled registration had sale or rental listings in the last year, and the total number of listings in the city did not rise39. Possible explanations: many cancelled registrations were no longer active; others carry on operating without registration (at least 4% were taking bookings). The study is by a residents' association with a stated position on the subject39.
  3. There are more empty homes than short-term rentals. Lisbon had 48,018 vacant homes in the 2021 Census, about four times the current number of short-term rentals39. Santa Maria Maior has 31.4% vacant homes and Misericórdia 33.1%31.
  4. Prices also rise where there is no tourism. In Q2 2026 prices rose in all 26 sub-regions of the country; the biggest rises were in Médio Tejo (+25.4%), Oeste (+24.0%) and Lezíria do Tejo (+23.9%)47.

Where this trend begins

YearWhat happensSource
2008Short-term rentals appear in the lawdiploma to be confirmed
2009–2013First registrations in Santa Maria Maior: between 9 and 43 a year35
2014Dedicated short-term rental regime; 243 new registrations in Santa Maria Maior; 14,127 nationally30, 35, 38
2014–2018Short-term rentals grow about 100% a year in Lisbon34
2015Peak share of renovation in completed works (a third)8, 9
2015–2017In Alfama, 21 buildings renovated, 12 entirely for short-term rental36
end of 2018First containment zones in Lisbon; works fall in those parishes32
2011–2021Santa Maria Maior loses 28% of its family homes and 22% of its residents31, 34
2025–2026Clean-up of inactive registrations; Lisbon goes from about 18,600 to 11,704 registrations39, 40

Reading

The hypothesis holds where short-term rentals were concentrated. In Lisbon's four central neighbourhoods, which account for 61% of the city's short-term rentals39, there was at the same time restoration of run-down buildings and an exit of homes and residents from housing. Nationally, short-term rentals are about 2% of the stock and are not enough to explain the general rise in prices. One question remains: without tourism, how many of these buildings would be restored today, and how many would still be derelict?

6

Chapter 6 · Money from abroad

Money from abroad opened the cycle; those speeding it up today live here.

Golden visas arrived in October 2012, in the middle of the troika, and brought about 6 billion euros into real estate up to 202262. In volume they weighed little: about 2% to 3% of the value of home sales in a typical yearcalculation. The strongest effect was concentrated in time and in segment: at the start of the rise (2013–2014), in homes around 500,000 euros and in the municipality of Lisbon. When the programme was restricted (2022) and closed to real estate (2023), prices kept rising.

When, who and why

  • The law: Law 29/2012, of 9 August, which amended the foreigners law and created the residence permit for investment activity57. It came into force on 8 October 201256.
  • The government: the 19th Constitutional Government, of Pedro Passos Coelho (PSD/CDS-PP). The programme was launched by Paulo Portas, then Minister of Foreign Affairs56.
  • The why: to attract foreign investment into a country under an adjustment programme, with credit shut down and prices falling. The visas were created "as a mechanism to attract investment"68.
  • The three original routes, held for at least five years: a capital transfer of at least 1 million euros; the creation of at least 30 jobs; or the purchase of property worth at least 500,000 euros57. Later came the urban renovation route, with a threshold of 350,000 euros65.

Year by year

YearVisas grantedInvestmentSource
20122—58
2013494—58
20141,526about €921 million58; investmentsecondary
2015766—58
20161,414—58
20171,351—58
20181,409about €838 million58;59calculation
20191,245€742 million59
20201,182€647 million60
2021865about €461 million61;62calculation
20221,281€654 million62
20232,091not published63
20242,081not published63
20252,685 (peak)not published63

Up to 2022, 10,593 of the 11,535 visas were through property purchase, with 6,041 million of the 6,754 million euros invested (89%)62calculation. The renovation route added 1,485 visas and 534 million62. Job creation accounted for 22 visas in ten years62.

China dominated the early years: 4,467 of the 8,207 visas up to 2019, more than half59calculation. In 2025 the United States led for the fourth year running (535), ahead of China (392) and the United Kingdom (252)63.

The four phases

  1. Start (2012–2014). From 2 visas in 2012 to 1,526 in 2014. By October 2014, 1,775 visas had been issued, with more than 1,075 million euros, 972 million of it in property; only three visas had been through job creation56.
  2. Brake and recovery (2015–2020). In November 2014, alleged corruption in running the programme led to the resignation of the Minister of Internal Administration, Miguel Macedo56. In 2015 visas fell to 766, and one study treats that year as a suspension period67. From 2016 they went back to about 1,200 to 1,400 a year58, 59, 60.
  3. Restriction (2021–2022). Decree-Law 14/2021, of 12 February, from the António Costa government (PS), removed residential property in Lisbon, Porto and the coast from the programme from 1 January 2022, leaving it for the interior, the Azores and Madeira. It also raised the amounts for other routes (capital from 500,000 to 1.5 million euros)64. The justification was to steer foreign investment to low-density regions64. Applications had to be in by 31 December 202165, which is why 2022 still brought 1,281 visas62.
  4. End of the property route (2023 onwards). The Mais Habitação package, approved by the Council of Ministers on 16 February 2023, ended new golden visas through property. Existing ones are only renewed, for property, if the home is a permanent own residence or is let on a long-term basis. The government presented the measure as a fight against property speculation66. The programme continues through non-property funds, culture, science and jobs, and broke its record in 2025. AIMA stopped publishing the associated investment63.

The cumulative numbers do not add up

Up toVisasInvestmentSource
December 202211,535€6,754 million (total); €6,041 million (property)62
January 202311,628about €6.7 billion (total); about €6 billion (property)26
September 202312,718€6,451 million63
202518,254not published63

The September 2023 figure is lower than the December 2022 one. The most likely explanation is that the 6,451 million cover only the property route; other sources give 7,318 million in total up to that dateto be confirmed. Since the move from SEF to AIMA, there is no longer a public investment figure for 5,536 visas63.

The impact on prices

In volume, it was small. In 2019, the 661 million euros of visas through property purchase59 were equivalent to about 2.6% of the value of home sales that year (about 25.6 billion)9calculation. In number, 1,160 property visas against about 181,000 sales: 0.6%9, 59calculation. In 2022, total visa investment was about 2.1% of the value of sales10, 62calculation.

In the expensive segment, it was strong. In 2019, the average investment per visa on the 500,000-euro route was about 618,000 euros (584.5 million for 946 visas), more than four times the average value of a home sale (about 141,000 euros)9, 59calculation. The most complete study, by Pereira dos Santos and Strohmaier (IZA, 2024), uses every deed from 2007 to 2019 and finds67:

  • Bunching at 500,000 euros: the number of sales just above the threshold rose about 60% after 2012, because buyers began choosing homes of that value.
  • A price premium: homes sold just above 500,000 euros came to be worth about 38,000 euros above their tax value, a price rise of more than 10% (15% elsewhere in the text) in that segment.
  • No premium when the programme stopped: in 2015, the brake year, the premium disappears.
  • Where and what: golden visa buyers bought older, larger and less central homes. In 2020, 516 of the 813 property visas were in the municipality of Lisbon (63%).
  • Stated limits: only one pre-programme period to test trends, data only to 2019, and the possibility that the effect spread to Portuguese buyers by contagion.

In timing, it coincided with the turn. The 2014 visa peak (1,526) coincides with the highest share of non-residents in the value of sales (15.7%) and with the widest price gap between non-residents and residents (2.38 times)58, 69. Money from abroad came in strongly exactly when Portuguese credit was at its lowest and prices at the bottom.

But it was not the engine of the national rise. Prices kept rising in 2015, when visas halved; in 2022, after the restriction; and they accelerated in 2025 (+17.6%), two years after the end of the property route2, 58, 63. The association Transparência e Integridade blames the visas for "the dizzying rise in house prices"68, but presents no numbers to support it.

Reading

Yes, golden visas boosted the sale of expensive property: they concentrated demand at 500,000 euros, pushed up prices in that segment by more than 10%, and brought in money from abroad at a moment when nobody else was buying. Nationally, they were a small fraction of sales, and the price rise survived their restriction and their end. The role the data supports is that of a fuse in central Lisbon between 2013 and 2016, not the fuel of the decade.

Prices and sales to foreigners: what the cross-check shows

Crossing prices with sales to non-residents gives two results that seem contradictory and are not. Over time, the less buyers from abroad weigh, the more prices rise. On the map, the regions where buyers from abroad buy most are among the most expensive. Foreigners helped set the level of prices in certain places and at the start of the cycle; the recent acceleration comes from buyers who live in Portugal.

Over time: an inverse relationship

Between 2014 and 2025, the share of non-residents in the value of sales fell from 15.7% to 8.2%, and the annual rise in prices went from 4.3% to 17.6%2, 9, 69calculation. Over the eight years with data, the correlation between the two series is −0.85; without 2025, −0.68calculation. Three caveats: there are only eight points; the scope changes halfway (to 2020 INE counts all property, afterwards only housing); and a correlation does not say what causes what.

What the series suggests: the peak share of buyers from abroad was in 2014, at the bottom of the market, when Portuguese credit was at its lowest and golden visas at their peak58, 69. As resident buyers came back (with credit, low interest rates and, later, immigration and support for young buyers), the share of buyers from abroad was diluted and prices accelerated.

The price gap between buyers from outside and inside

YearNon-residents pay, on average, how many times the residents' priceMeasureSource
20121.80average price per property, all property69
20142.38 (peak)same69
20171.56same69
20191.66same69
2023about 1.79average price per home70calculation
Q2 20261.31median price per m²47calculation

The gap was widest in 2014 and narrowed afterwards. Between 2012 and 2019, the average price paid by residents grew 7.7% a year, more than that paid by non-residents (6.8%)69. From a certain point, it was buyers from inside who pushed prices up more. The measures in the table are not the same (average per property, average per home, median per square metre): they show the trend, not numbers to compare one by one.

On the map: a direct relationship

RegionShare of non-residents in the value of salesMedian price (€/m²)Sources
Algarve38.7% (2019); 38.5% (2023)3,139 (2025)69, 70, 54
Oeste18.0% (2019)2,220 (Q1 2026)69, 72
Alentejo Litoral15.0% (2019)2,150 (Q1 2026)69, 72
Lisbon Metropolitan Area10.4% (2019)3,439 (Grande Lisboa, 2025)69, 54
Norte3.1% (2019–2021)2,305 (Porto Metropolitan Area, 2025)71, 54
Portugal13.3% (2019); 8.2% (2025)2,076 (2025)69, 542025 secondary

The regions where buyers from abroad weigh most (Algarve, Oeste, Alentejo Litoral) are above the national median, and the Algarve is the second most expensive region in the country. The exception is Grande Lisboa: it is the most expensive, with a much smaller share of non-residents than the Algarve. In Lisbon, the price is set mainly by those who live there or want to. In the Algarve, close to 40% of the value comes from those buying from abroad. The years in the two columns do not match; the INE table by sub-region with share and price for the same year, needed to make this comparison rigorously, is missing.

What follows from this

  1. The foreign buyer was decisive at the start, in 2013–2014, when almost nobody in Portugal was buying. That is when they weighed most and paid relatively more.
  2. In tourist and second-home areas (Algarve, Oeste, Alentejo Litoral), they still set the price level.
  3. In the recent acceleration, the share of buyers from abroad fell and that of resident buyers, Portuguese and foreigners who live here, rose. The difference between INE's 5% of non-residents and Banco de Portugal's 28% of buyers of foreign nationality is precisely this group43.
7

Chapter 7 · 2020–2025

Every shock at once, and all of them passed into the price.

In 2025 the price index rose 17.6%, the biggest annual rise of the period, and the value of sales reached 41.2 billion euros, the highest in the series that began in 20092, 55. In this block everything moved: population, interest rates, credit, construction, rents and rules. It is the block in which it is hardest to separate the causes.

The numbers for the block

Variable202020212022202320242025Source
Nominal index (2010 = 100)143.7157.3177.1191.7209.1245.82calculation
Nominal change+8.8%+9.4%+12.6%+8.2%+9.1%+17.6%2calculation
Real change+8.8%+8.0%+4.5%+3.7%+6.5%+14.9%1calculation
Implied inflation0.0%1.3%7.8%4.3%2.4%2.3%1, 2calculation
12-month Euribor, annual average−0.30%−0.49%1.09%3.87%3.27%2.22%4calculation
New homes completed (family housing)16,71019,56520,15623,100 to 23,65225,30026,700 to 27,3019, 10, 15, 16; 2025 highsecondary
New homes permitted25,08329,31230,24732,51934,60041,9009, 10, 15, 16
Home sales171,800—167,900—about 156,400169,8129, 10, 55; 2024calculation
Median rent of new contracts (€/m²)5.61—6.52—7.979.29 (new method)9, 10, 48; 2025to be confirmed
Foreign population (PORDATA series to 2023, AIMA in 2024)661,607698,536781,2471,044,2381,543,697—5, 6
Monthly minimum wage (€)63566570576082087022

Interest rates: the only brake that worked a little

The 12-month Euribor went from −0.49% in 2021 to 3.87% in 20234calculation. In 2022 and 2023 real price growth slowed to 4.5% and 3.7%1calculation, and sales fell. But nominal prices never fell: they rose 12.6% and 8.2% in those two years. When rates came down, in 2024 and 2025, prices accelerated to +9.1% and +17.6%.

The interest-rate brake slowed the price rise without stopping it. It is an important difference from 2008, when rising rates coincided with falling prices.

Credit: three series, three numbers

Banco de Portugal publishes mortgage lending in series that are not comparable with each other (with and without renegotiations, for example). For 2023 there are three numbers: 18.2 billion euros, including renegotiations18; 24.5 billion, in a thesis citing Banco de Portugal19; and about 13.1 billion in new contracts, according to other estimatesto be confirmed.

With that caveat, the direction is clear. In 2021, 14.8 billion were lent17. In 2025, for permanent own homes alone, it was more than 19 billion in more than 105,000 contracts45. The stock of mortgage lending went from 87.4 billion in 2019 to 101.3 billion in 202117.

Two groups gained weight in new lending:

  • Foreigners: 7.38% of the amount in 2021 and 13.56% in 2025, about 2.6 billion euros. Brazilians account for 44% of that amount45.
  • Young people up to 35: about 60% of the amount of new contracts for permanent own homes in 2025, after the public guarantee and the 2024 exemption from property transfer tax (IMT) for young buyerssecondary.

Immigration: the second wave, bigger and faster

The foreign population went from 661,607 in 2020 to 1,044,238 in 2023 and 1,543,697 in 20245, 6. In 2024, Brazilians were 31.4%, Indians 7.4%, Angolans 6.9% and Ukrainians 5.9%6.

Three caveats before linking this number to prices:

  1. The counts changed. AIMA began including pending regularisation cases, and the series were revised. For 2023 there are at least two official numbers: 1,044,238 and about 1.29 million5second number to be confirmed.
  2. The flow has already slowed. According to Banco de Portugal, net inflow of immigrants averaged 13,200 a month in 2024 and 6,200 a month in 2025, less than half46. Prices accelerated in the year the flow slowed.
  3. Those who arrive and those who buy are, to a large extent, different people. Recent immigration is concentrated on low incomes and on renting or shared housingsecondary. Its effect should be felt first in rents and overcrowding, and only later in purchases.

Median rents for new contracts went from €5.61/m² in 2020 to €7.97/m² in 2024, +42% in four years9, 48calculation. Overcrowded dwellings rose 17.1% between 2011 and 202112. A Banco de Portugal study (October 2026) estimates that a 1% increase in housing demand raises prices 0.69% and rents 0.37%, more in municipalities where supply responds less to price42. In that study's model, Lisbon, Sintra, Gaia and Porto appear among the municipalities where supply responds more, not less (see chapter 9, point 10).

Foreign buyers: 5% or 28%?

MeasureValueSource
Buyers with tax residence outside Portugal, 20208.3% of homes, 14.0% of valueINE9
Buyers with tax residence outside Portugal, 20255.0% of homes, 8.2% of valueINEsecondary
Buyers of foreign nationality, resident or not, 201925%Banco de Portugal43
The same, 2023 (peak)31%Banco de Portugal43
The same, 202528%Banco de Portugal43

The two numbers measure different things. INE counts those who do not live in Portugal. Banco de Portugal counts those without Portuguese nationality, whether they live here or not. The difference (from 5% to 28%) is mostly foreigners who live in Portugal and buy a home, a group that grew with immigration (an inference from the two definitions; the series separating foreign residents is missing). Non-residents lost weight; foreign residents gained it.

They pay more: according to Banco de Portugal, foreign residents and non-residents pay on average 43% more per home44. In Q2 2026, the median price paid by non-residents was €3,182/m², against €2,421/m² paid by residents47.

Supply: it recovered, but little

New homes completed went from 16,710 in 2020 to about 27,000 in 2025, and permits to 41,900, the highest level since 20089, 16. Even so, 2025 construction is about a quarter of the 2000–2004 average14calculation. The sector says capacity "is at the limit", with a shortage of 80,000 to 100,000 workers49.

Banco de Portugal estimates an accumulated deficit of about 300,000 homes over the last decade: demand (mainly population and household growth through immigration) grew more than homes completed. The governor considers that, in 2026, the annual flow of supply and demand has already balanced, but that the accumulated deficit remains16.

Overvaluation: 35%, 40% or under 20%?

  • European Commission (October 2025, data to 2024): about 35%, and Portugal is the only country where overvaluation rose significantly28.
  • Average of four ECB metrics (Q1 2026): +40%, the highest in the EU, according to the bank KBC29.
  • ECB econometric model, on its own: Portugal is not among the countries above 20%29KBC inference.

The gap between the metrics is 40 percentage points or more in the Portuguese case29. The price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios give very high values; the econometric model, which also considers interest rates and demand, gives lower values (KBC's reading).

Policies of the block

  • Mais Habitação (2023): end of the property route for golden visas and restrictions on new short-term rental registrationsdiploma to be confirmed.
  • Public guarantee and exemption from IMT and stamp duty for young people up to 35 (2024)diploma to be confirmed.
  • End of the "expression of interest" route (June 2024): changed the way immigrants enterto be confirmed.
  • Lisbon (2025): new short-term rental registrations banned in six parishes and nine neighbourhoodssecondary.

Where the trends of this block begin

  • Rising interest rates: 2022, after six years of negative Euribor4.
  • The second wave of immigration on a large scale: 2023, when the foreign population passes one million5.
  • The share of foreigners in lending: almost doubles from 2021 to 202545.
  • The recovery of construction: completions rise every year from 2020, but from a very low level9, 16.
8

Chapter 8 · Geography

The housing shortage has an address.

In 2025, a square metre sold in Lisbon cost 4,875 euros, more than double the national median of 2,07654. But in 2026 the fastest rise is no longer in Lisbon: it is in Médio Tejo (+25.4%), Oeste (+24.0%) and Lezíria do Tejo (+23.9%), while Lisbon and Porto slow down47. The pressure that began in the historic centres spread outwards in rings.

Median sale prices, 2025

Region€/m²Against the national median
Grande Lisboa3,439+66%
Algarve3,139+51%
Península de Setúbal2,596+25%
Madeira2,500+20%
Porto Metropolitan Area2,305+11%
Portugal2,076—

Source: INE, Construction and Housing Statistics 2025, via Observador54; last columncalculation. The most expensive municipalities are Lisbon (4,875), Cascais (4,550), Oeiras (4,187), Loulé (3,993) and Lagos (3,801)54.

The wave moving away from the centre

In Q2 2026, prices rose in all 26 sub-regions of the country, with the national median at €2,445/m² (+18.4%)47. Lisbon, at €5,299/m², slowed by 8.9 percentage points; Porto slowed by 5.4 points. The biggest rises were in the regions around the Lisbon Metropolitan Area: Médio Tejo, Oeste, Lezíria do Tejo and Península de Setúbal (+22.2%)47.

The pattern is consistent with people leaving Lisbon because they cannot buy or rent there. The data gathered here does not allow that movement of people to be proven: it is a hypothesis to test with INE's internal migration data.

The buyer from abroad pays more, especially in Lisbon

Region (Q2 2026)Non-residents (€/m²)Residents (€/m²)Difference
Grande Lisboa5,8784,000+47%
Porto Metropolitan Area3,6402,648+37%
Madeira3,6112,785+30%
Algarve4,1433,368+23%
Península de Setúbal3,2403,063+6%

Source: INE via DN47; Lisbon and Porto differences as published, the restcalculation. Non-residents pay more per square metre, but they may also buy different homes (more central, newer or renovated). The median does not separate the two, and I did not find a comparison for identical homes.

Renting: Lisbon costs double

In 2024, the median rent of new contracts was €15.93/m² in the municipality of Lisbon and €12.58/m² in Porto, against €7.97/m² nationally48. In Lisbon, rent per square metre is double the national figure.

Where supply does not respond

The study by João Amador (Banco de Portugal, October 2026) concludes that demand shocks have "substantially larger" effects where supply responds less to price. Contrary to how the press summarised it, the study does not put Lisbon and Porto at the top of those municipalities: by its measure, Lisbon has the highest supply elasticity in the country and Sintra the smallest effect of demand on prices. In the Algarve, yes: supply that responds little meets demand from non-residents and investment42. A study by the consultancy Neoturis says Lisbon had only 2,352 new homes between 2015 and 202340secondary.

Empty homes by region

Region (2021 Census)Vacancy rate
Alto Alentejo and Médio Tejo (highest)17.4%
Portugal12.1%
Algarve11.9%
Grande Lisboa11.1%
Porto Metropolitan Area10.0%

Source: INE12. Empty homes exist everywhere, but they weigh more where demand is lower. Even so, Grande Lisboa has 11.1% vacant homes: Lisbon's problem is not only the number of homes, it is also homes that are not on the market.

Four regional portraits

The country has at least four housing markets, and each moves for different reasons. The portraits follow the same outline: what moves the price, who buys, how much is built, which explanations compete and where the numbers do not add up. The common basis is Banco de Portugal's June 2026 Economic Bulletin, which crosses prices, rents, short-term rentals and credit municipality by municipality73.

RegionMedian price 2025 (€/m²)Non-resident premium (Q2 2026)Weight of short-term rentalsWhat seems to weigh most
Lisbon (municipality)4,875+47% (Grande Lisboa)High in the historic centre; 6,765 registrations ordered cancelled in 2026Outside demand and lack of land
Porto (metropolitan area)2,305+37%About 12% of the Porto municipality's registrations to be cancelledTourism and renovation in the centre, then the metropolitan ring
Algarve3,139+23%More than 10% of homes in eight municipalitiesSecond homes and non-resident investment
Lisbon's periphery (Península de Setúbal)2,596+6%Low, below 1.5% in most peripheral municipalitiesResident families leaving the centre

Sources: prices54; non-resident premium47, with Lisbon and Porto as published and the restcalculation; short-term rentals73, 74.

Portrait 1 — Lisbon: the centre that exports demand

What moves the price. Lisbon has the most expensive square metre in the country (4,875 euros in 2025) and a rent for new contracts that is double the national figure54, 48. Banco de Portugal shows why supply responds poorly: in the metropolitan areas urban land use is more intense, less land is left, and old, low-density buildings make renovation and densification harder73. The housing that exists is also poorly distributed: in 2021, 24% of homes with four or more rooms in Lisbon had a single occupant, against 18.8% nationally73.

Who buys. Lisbon was the municipality with the most homes sold in 2025 (8,235)75. In Grande Lisboa, buyers with tax residence abroad paid 47% more per square metre than residents in Q2 202647.

How much is built. Little. The consultancy Neoturis counts 2,352 new homes in the city between 2015 and 202340secondary. Among completed homes, small types (studio to two-bedroom) gain weight in Lisbon, Porto and the Algarve73.

Short-term rentals. In February 2026, the City Council ordered 6,765 registrations cancelled, about 40% of the 19,000 in existence, for lack of liability insurance74. The association Vizinhos em Lisboa notes that the homes did not return to the housing market39.

Competing explanations. The supply reading says Lisbon built far too little for the households its area gained (see the regional test in this chapter). João Amador's study adds a nuance: between 2017 and 2024, Lisbon's supply was, in percentage terms, among those that reacted most to price42. Both can be true at once: reacting strongly from almost nothing is still little. The outside-demand reading points to the 47% non-resident premium. The two are not mutually exclusive: Banco de Portugal concludes that prices and rents rose together, which fits a market driven by fundamentals rather than by a bubble of expectations73.

Where it does not add up. The short-term rental clean-up cut about 40% of registrations, but no effect is visible on the supply of homes. Either the cancelled registrations were already inactive ("ghosts"), or the homes went to another use. Public data does not allow the two hypotheses to be separated. The 2026 slowdown (8.9 percentage points less47) also has two readings: Lisbon has reached the limit of what people will pay, or demand has moved out.

Portrait 2 — Porto: the same film, a few years later

What moves the price. The Porto Metropolitan Area has a median price of €2,305/m², only 11% above the national figure54. The municipality of Porto is something else: the rent of new contracts was €12.58/m² in 2024, more than 50% above the national figure48calculation. The sequence repeats Lisbon with a delay: historic centre renovated, tourism, short-term rentals, then the rise spreading through the ring.

Who buys. Non-residents paid 37% more per square metre than residents in Q2 202647. In 2025, Vila Nova de Gaia sold more homes (5,494) than Porto itself (4,503)75: the metropolitan area already trades more outside the city than inside it.

Short-term rentals. In May 2026, Porto City Council ordered 1,413 registrations cancelled, about 12% of the total74, a much smaller clean-up than Lisbon's.

A trait of its own. The Porto Metropolitan Area is among the areas with the most social housing in the country73. Banco de Portugal credits social housing with a stabilising effect on rents73. Whether that explains part of the difference from Lisbon is a hypothesis, not a result: the data gathered here does not test it.

Where it does not add up. In Q1 2026, Porto's rate of increase accelerated by 2.4 percentage points54. In Q2, it slowed by 5.4 points47. Two consecutive quarters with opposite signs show that the quarterly municipal series is volatile: you cannot draw a trend from one quarter.

Portrait 3 — The Algarve: a market that sells abroad

What moves the price. The Algarve has the second-highest regional price (€3,139/m², 51% above the national median), with Loulé (3,993) and Lagos (3,801) among the five most expensive municipalities in the country54. It is also where short-term rentals weigh most: in eight municipalities they take more than 10% of homes, against 1.6% on the mainland73.

Who buys. Banco de Portugal writes that price-to-income ratios in the Algarve are above the national average and strongly influenced by non-resident demand73. According to INE, non-residents made 20.1% of home purchases in the Algarve in 2025 and 31.3% of the value, against 28.5% and 42.4% in 201981calculation.

How much is built. Banco de Portugal identifies in the Algarve the same urban pattern as in Lisbon and Porto: medium-height buildings and small homes (studio to two-bedroom), linked to density, land costs and tourism73.

Competing explanations. The tourism reading says the Algarve is paid for at prices from abroad. The supply reading says that even there construction did not keep up with demand. João Amador's study shows that the Algarve weighs on the national results: when the region is isolated, the effect of 1% of demand on prices falls from 0.69% to 0.51%, because there supply that responds little meets demand from non-residents and investment42. Banco de Portugal adds a note of scale: international studies find significant effects of short-term rentals on prices, but they explain only a minority of the rise73.

Where it does not add up. The non-resident premium is the lowest of the large regions (+23%47), even though the weight of foreigners is the highest. One possible explanation: when the buyer from abroad is a third of the market's value, they stop paying "more" than the others and start setting the price for everyone. Another sign pointing the same way: Algarve residents expect the smallest price rise next year (3.7%, against 6.6% in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area)73. Those who live there are not the ones pushing the price.

Portrait 4 — Lisbon's periphery: where the rise was biggest

What moves the price. Between 2017 and 2025, prices more than doubled in 157 of the 286 municipalities with data. In Sintra, Seixal, Barreiro, Moita and Setúbal, the rise per square metre passed 200%73. In rents, Moita is among the three municipalities where the rent of new contracts rose more than 125% between 2017 and 202473. Banco de Portugal calls this the "territorial spread of appreciation": demand moved to municipalities where, in 2017, buying was cheap compared with renting73.

Who buys. Mainly residents. In Península de Setúbal, non-residents paid only 6% more than residents47. Sintra was the second municipality in the country by number of homes sold in 2025 (6,363)75. Short-term rentals are residual73.

The role of credit. You would expect the periphery, where families buy with a loan, to have risen on the back of credit. Banco de Portugal does not find that relationship: between 2019 and 2025, the municipalities with the biggest price rises did not have a larger increase in the weight of credit or in the loan-to-value ratio73.

The wave continues. In Q2 2026, the biggest rises in the country were around the Lisbon Metropolitan Area: Médio Tejo, Oeste, Lezíria do Tejo and Península de Setúbal (+22.2%)47.

Where it does not add up. In percentage terms, the periphery led. In euros, the distance to Lisbon remains: €2,596/m² in Península de Setúbal against 4,875 in the municipality of Lisbon54. A rise of 200% from a low base does not make the periphery an expensive market; it makes it a market that stopped being cheap. And the most obvious explanation, families leaving Lisbon, is still to be proven with internal migration data.

What the four portraits have in common

The direction is the same everywhere; the engine is not. In Lisbon and the Algarve, outside demand and the lack of land where demand is concentrated weigh most. In Porto, the Lisbon pattern arrived later and looks more moderate. In the periphery, buyers are mainly residents, and the rise largely measures Lisbon's price overflowing. To the question "who sets the price?", the answer changes with the map: a single thesis for the whole country risks describing one region well and the other three badly.

The regional test: new homes against new households

The thesis says the housing shortage is local. If that is true, it has to show in the numbers: in the most sought-after regions, the number of new homes has to fall far short of the number of new households, and in the rest of the country it does not. The data came directly from INE's database: new homes completed by region since 199576, households in the 2001, 2011 and 2021 Censuses77, 78 and homes by type of occupancy in the three Censuses79.

The result: 74% of new households, 34% of new homes

RegionNew households (Census 2011–2021)New homes completed (2011–2020)New homes per new household
Grande Lisboa+24,32213,3630.55
Península de Setúbal+20,8839,5610.46
Grande Porto+22,83012,7370.56
Algarve+11,0328,8520.80
The four regions+79,06744,5130.56
Rest of the country+27,15986,5153.19
Portugal+106,226131,0281.23

Sources:76, 77, 78; differences and ratioscalculation. The regions are the 2002 NUTS III (Grande Lisboa: the nine municipalities north of the Tagus; Grande Porto: the nine central municipalities of the metropolitan area). In 2011 INE counted "classic families" and in 2021 "private households", both in homes of usual residence: the concepts are close but not identical. The Lisbon Metropolitan Area's own assessment, using another source, reaches almost identical values (+24,046 in Grande Lisboa, +21,370 in Península de Setúbal)80.

The four regions gained three quarters of the country's new households and received a third of its new homes. Outside them, more than three homes were built for each new household. The country as a whole built more homes than it gained households; the problem is where.

Municipality by municipality

MunicipalityNew households (2011–2021)New homes (2011–2020)Homes per new household
Lisbon−9271,735—
Sintra+9,0461,7320.19
Vila Nova de Gaia+7,0282,7880.40
Seixal+5,3352,9080.55
Porto+2,0992,9031.38

Sources:76, 77, 78;calculation. Lisbon completed 1,735 new homes in a decade, fewer than 200 a year, and lost households. Sintra, the second municipality in the country for home sales75, gained more than nine thousand households with fewer than two thousand new homes. Porto is the exception: it is the only one of these municipalities that built more homes than it gained households.

The fall was biggest where demand was biggest

RegionNew homes 2001–20102011–20202021–2025Worst year against the peak
Grande Lisboa95,57813,36314,690473 in 2016 (2.6% of the 2000 peak)
Península de Setúbal59,2859,5619,604352 in 2014 (3.4%)
Grande Porto98,00612,73720,280455 in 2015 (2.3%)
Algarve78,7068,8526,731536 in 2015 (5.2%)
Portugal762,594131,028115,2207,148 in 2015 (5.7%)

Source:76; the 2021 to 2025 values are provisional at INE. In their worst year, Grande Lisboa and Grande Porto were building between 2% and 3% of what they built at the peak; the country stayed at 5.7%. After 2021 the regions diverge: Grande Porto went from 9.7% to 17.6% of the country's new homes, while the Algarve fell from 10.3% (2001–2010) to 6.8% and then 5.8%, despite being the region that has gained the most population since 2021 (+13.8%, in INE's new series)76secondary for population.

Where demand without new homes went: the existing stock

RegionVacant homes 200120112021Second homes 200120112021
Grande Lisboa11.9%12.8%11.1%10.7%10.1%8.5%
Península de Setúbal10.9%11.7%9.6%17.5%15.2%12.8%
Grande Porto11.9%12.7%10.1%9.7%9.5%8.4%
Algarve9.4%13.2%11.9%38.5%39.5%38.6%
Portugal10.8%12.5%12.1%18.4%19.3%18.5%

Source:79; percentages of total homescalculation. Between 2011 and 2021, vacant homes fell by 44,653 in the four regions and by only 11,913 nationally: outside them, they rose by about 33,000calculation. In Grande Lisboa, Península de Setúbal and Grande Porto, second homes also fell, by about 32,000 in total. The demand that found no new home went into homes that already existed: vacant homes occupied again and second homes that became family homes. Not in the Algarve: the share of second homes stayed at 39%.

This also changes how to read the 723,000 empty homes of 2021. In 2001, the country already had 543,777 vacant homes (10.8%)79. Vacancies grew in the decade when a lot was built and fell, in the sought-after regions, in the decade when building stopped.

The Algarve: who buys and who works there

INE's quarterly data by the buyer's tax residence81 confirms the weight of buyers from abroad in the Algarve and shows it is falling:

AlgarvePurchases by non-residents (number)Share of valueAverage value, non-residentAverage value, resident
201928.5%42.4%€298,000€162,000
202226.2%37.9%€411,000€238,000
202520.1%31.3%€572,000€316,000

Source:81; sum of the four quarters and difference between the total and purchases with tax residence in Portugalcalculation. The average value per purchase is not price per square metre: it mixes sizes and types of home.

How many salaries a home costs in each region

RegionMedian price 2025 (€/m²)Average monthly earnings 2024Months of salary per m²Years of salary for 90 m²
Algarve3,139€1,3202.415.3
Grande Lisboa3,439€1,9361.811.4
Península de Setúbal2,596€1,5451.710.8
Porto Metropolitan Area2,305€1,6201.49.1
Portugal2,076€1,5761.38.5

Sources: prices54; average monthly earnings of employees, Quadros de Pessoal82;calculation, with 14 payments a year and before tax. The Algarve is the region where a home is least affordable for those who work there: the price is set by those who buy with income from abroad. Nationally, average earnings rose 44% between 2015 and 2024 (from 1,094 to 1,576 euros)82, while the house price index rose more than double that2calculation.

What the test does not settle

  • Internal migration: the 2021 Census shows that 8.7% of residents of Península de Setúbal and 7.8% of those of Grande Lisboa lived in another municipality a year earlier, against 7.0% nationally83calculation. But the public database does not say where they came from. The origin-destination matrix (who left Lisbon for where) can only be obtained by request to INE.
  • After 2021 there is no annual count of households by region. Banco de Portugal estimates household formation at national level (about 35,000 a year on average over the last four decades, with about 52,000 households a year coming from immigration after 2021)84secondary.
  • Spain: at the peak, in 2006, it completed 658,510 homes; at the trough, in 2016, 44,630; in 2024, 100,98085. Per inhabitant, Spain built more than Portugal at the peak (about 15 against 12 homes per thousand inhabitants)calculation, but the Spanish peak came at the end of the bubble, with prices rising, and the Portuguese one came in 2002, before real prices began to fall. What separates the two countries at the start of the century is credit, not construction.

New homes for each new household, 2011–2020

New homes for each new household, 2011–2020Grande Lisboa 0.55; Península de Setúbal 0.46; Grande Porto 0.56; Algarve 0.80; rest of the country 3.19.0.000.881.752.623.50Grande Lisboa0.55Península de Setúbal0.46Grande Porto0.56Algarve0.80Rest of country3.19
New homes completed between 2011 and 2020 divided by the increase in households between the 2011 and 2021 Censuses. Sources: 76, 77, 78; own calculation.

Years of salary to pay for 90 m²

Years of salary to pay for 90 m²Algarve 15.3; Grande Lisboa 11.4; Península de Setúbal 10.8; Porto Metropolitan Area 9.1; Portugal 8.5.0.04.08.012.016.0Algarve15.3Grande Lisboa11.4Península de Setúbal10.8Porto Metro9.1Portugal8.5
Median 2025 price times 90 m², divided by 2024 average monthly earnings times 14. Sources: 54, 82; own calculation.
9

Chapter 9 · Contradictions

The official numbers do not add up, and that changes conclusions.

On a subject where everyone quotes numbers, the official sources disagree on almost every key quantity: how many homes are built, how many immigrants there are, how much credit is granted, how many homes are missing, how much the foreign buyer weighs. The differences are not mistakes: they come from definitions, revisions and choices of method. But they change the conclusion you draw. These are the eleven most important contradictions, each with what explains it and what it changes.

1. How many homes are built

YearNumbers foundSources
201320,689 (2014 edition) or 12,751 (current series in PORDATA)7; PORDATAsecondary
2015about 6,600, 7,148 or 7,8178calculation;13;9
201912,954 or 13,092PORDATAsecondary;9
202323,100 or 23,65216;15
202526,700 or 27,30116; INEsecondary

What explains it: INE does not count completed homes one by one; it estimates them with a regression model based on the deadline in the permit, and revises earlier years11. The biggest difference, for 2013 (20,689 against 12,751), suggests a deep revision of the series, still to be documented.

What it changes: the order of magnitude holds (construction fell to a tenth and recovered to a quarter of the early 2000s). But any calculation of "missing homes" made with one version can differ by tens of thousands from one made with another.

2. How many immigrants there are

YearNumbers foundSources
2017416,682 or 421,8025;6
2022781,247 or 994,011 (revised)5;to be confirmed
20231,044,238 or about 1.29 to 1.30 million (revised)5;to be confirmed
20241,543,6976

What explains it: AIMA began counting pending regularisation cases, and earlier series were revised upwards. INE also revised net migration and the resident populationJune 2026 revision to be confirmed.

What it changes: "quadrupled in seven years" (from 421,802 to 1,543,697) compares an old count with a new one. With the revised series, the rise is still huge, but the year-on-year pace changes.

3. How much credit is granted

YearNumbers foundSources
2012about 1.9 billion or 2.03 billion19;17calculation
201910.33 billion or about 10.95 billion17;19calculation
202313.1, 18.2 or 24.5 billionto be confirmed;18;19

What explains it: Banco de Portugal has series with and without renegotiations, and a series of new contracts that only begins in December 2014. In 2023, with rates rising, many families renegotiated, and that inflates the series that include them.

What it changes: saying that 2023 lending beat 2007's (19.6 billion) depends on the series chosen.

4. How much prices rose in the last decade

Almost 240%27, 180%secondary, 175% or 164%2calculation, or 114% in real terms1calculation. See "Before you read: how a home's price is measured".

5. How overvalued homes are

About 35% (European Commission, data to 2024)28, +40% (average of four ECB metrics, early 2026)29, or below 20% (ECB econometric model, according to KBC)29. In 2007, Banco de Portugal saw no overvaluation at all20.

What it changes: at 35% to 40%, the risk of a correction is high. At under 20%, prices are expensive but explained by fundamentals.

6. How many homes are missing, and how many are empty

EstimateWhoMethodSource
150,000 to 200,000Developers (APPII and others)Not explained49
180,000 over the next decadeStudy cited by idealistaTo be confirmedsecondary
About 300,000 (2021–2025)Financial Times, Banco de España methodNew households against homes permitted two years earlier50
About 300,000 (last decade)Banco de PortugalNew supply against what was needed to keep up with demand16
380,000Construction sectorTo be confirmedsecondary
723,215 vacant homes2021 CensusCount on Census day12

What explains it: "missing" depends on where, for whom and at what price. Vacant homes are mostly where demand is not: the vacancy rate is 17.4% in Alto Alentejo and Médio Tejo and 11.1% in Grande Lisboa12. But even Lisbon has 48,018 vacant homes39.

What it changes: the two statements "there are not enough homes" and "there are homes to spare" are true at the same time, in different places.

7. How much foreign buyers weigh

5.0% (INE, tax residence outside Portugal, 2025) or 28% (Banco de Portugal, foreign nationality, 2025)43secondary. See chapters 6 and 7.

8. How many short-term rentals there are

About 125,000 registrations in 2025, more than 40,000 of them inactive40. In Lisbon, about 18,600 registrations before the clean-up and 11,704 after39, 40. In Santa Maria Maior, a ratio between 52% and 77% of homes, depending on the formula31, 33.

What it changes: old registrations inflated the size of short-term rentals for years, and the containment rules were decided with those numbers40.

9. How much it costs to rent

The median rent of new contracts was €7.97/m² in 202448. For 2025, INE publishes €9.29/m² (+9.7%) with a new methodologyto be confirmed. If the 9.7% change is applied to 2024's 7.97, it gives about 8.74, not 9.29calculation: the new method changed the level of the series. For Lisbon, there is €15.93/m² for the municipality in 202448 and 13.06 for Grande Lisboato be confirmed.

10. Where supply responds least

The press summarised João Amador's study by saying that the municipalities with the least supply, with Lisbon and Porto at the top, have the biggest rises. The original study says something else42. The supply elasticity it estimates (how much the housing stock grows when the price rises, between 2017 and 2024) goes from 0.5% in Lisbon, the highest in the country, to negative values in Lajes das Flores, Alvito and Mourão. The effect of 1% of demand on prices goes from 0.4% in Sintra to 0.8% in Mourão, with Lisbon, Faro, Porto and Gaia among the lowest. The author himself warns that these elasticities are simple correlations, not causal effects, and that they are correlated with population density (0.49).

The two measures answer different questions. The study's asks how much supply reacts to price; my regional test asks how many new homes there were for each new household. Lisbon can react strongly in percentage terms and still build far fewer homes than the households it gains. What cannot be written is that João Amador's study shows Lisbon and Porto as the municipalities with the most rigid supply.

11. Are there too many homes or too few?

SourceMeasureValue
IHRU, Report on Residential Renting, 2023Surplus of homes over households (stock)1,821,581 homes too many92secondary
National Housing ProgrammeHomes per household in 20211.4491
INE/LNEC, 2024Quantitative shortfall in 2021136,800 homes12
Banco de Portugal, June 2026Construction deficit against new households, last decadeabout 300,000 homes73
This analysisNew homes per new household, 2011–2020, in the four regions0.56 (3.19 in the rest of the country) (chapter 8)

IHRU concludes that "in no municipality are there more households than dwellings" and that the problem is not in the existing stock93secondary. Banco de Portugal and this analysis measure flows and reach the opposite. They neither add up nor reconcile: they are different questions. IHRU itself gives a clue for bringing them together: of the habitable vacant homes, 248,534 are off the market, mainly because the occupant died or the estate is awaiting division, with Lisbon (21,801) and Sintra (8,196) at the top93secondary. A home that exists but is neither for sale nor for rent is not supply. João Amador's study follows the same logic: it excludes from supply the vacant homes in regions losing population, "since these cannot meet demand pressures in growing regions"42.

10

Chapter 10 · Synthesis

No factor explains everything; stalled supply explains why all of them passed through.

No factor explains the 25 years on its own. Credit explains the 2008–2013 fall well and the 2001–2007 rise badly. Short-term rentals explain the historic centres well and the country badly. Immigration has weighed on rents since 2018 and did not weigh on prices in 2005–2009. The only factor present in every block is the relationship between new supply and demand shocks.

How much each factor weighs in each block

Factor2000–042005–092010–142015–192020–25
New construction (supply)holds prices backholds prices backirrelevant (no demand)amplifiesamplifies, less
Credit and interest ratesstrong, no effect on pricesstrong until 2007, then a brakedecisive in the fallmoderatestrong, both ways
Wages and incomeweakweakagainst (falling)weakmoderate
Tourism and short-term rentals——start (2014)strong in the historic centresweak nationally, strong locally
Investor and non-resident buyerweakweakstart (2012)moderatefalling
Immigrationweakstrong in number, no effect on pricesagainst (people leave)moderatestrong, mainly on rents
Public policyend of subsidised credit—seeds (visas, rents, renovation)weak brakesdemand support (young buyers)

This table is a reading summary, not a statistical model. Each cell rests on the data in the blocks and is there to compare periods, not as an exact measure.

1. Credit and interest rates

  • For: the 90% fall in new lending between 2007 and 2012 coincides with the 26% fall in the real price between 2007 and 20131, 17, 19. The 2025 acceleration (+17.6%) coincides with falling rates and record lending2, 4, 45.
  • Against: in 2001–2007, with low rates and credit growing to its peak, the real price fell 9%1. In 2023, with Euribor at 3.87%, the nominal price rose 8.2%2, 4.
  • Reading: credit is an accelerator and a brake, not an engine. It amplifies what supply lets through.

2. Construction and supply

  • For: with more than 100,000 new homes a year, plentiful credit did not push prices up (2000–2007). With fewer than 10,000 (2015–2016), every demand shock passed into prices1, 14. Banco de Portugal estimates that 1% more demand raises prices 0.69%, more where supply is lower42, and concludes that housing policy should focus above all on the capacity of supply to respond42.
  • Against: there are 723,215 vacant homes in the country and 48,018 in Lisbon12, 39; part of the problem is the use of the existing stock, not a lack of construction. Between 2020 and 2025 construction rose every year and prices accelerated16, 2. And building a lot did not protect Spain from a bubble in the 2000sto be confirmed with Spanish construction data.
  • Reading: supply is the variable that changes most between blocks and best separates periods of flat prices from periods of rising prices. But "supply" includes existing homes that are not on the market, not just new ones.

3. Tourism and short-term rentals

  • For: measured effect on prices (+3.7% to +4.5% per percentage point of Airbnb share, depending on the version of the study) and an 8.6% fall in prices when registrations were suspended31, 38. In Santa Maria Maior, 28% fewer family homes in ten years31, 34.
  • Against: about 2% of the national stock12, 40calculation. No measured effect outside Lisbon and Porto38. When short-term rentals fell back 37% in Lisbon, the homes did not return to the market39.
  • Reading: decisive in the historic centres, where it also paid for renovation; secondary at national scale.

4. Foreign demand (non-residents, golden visas)

  • For: non-residents pay 47% more per square metre in Grande Lisboa47. In 2019 they were 13.3% of the value of sales9.
  • Against: golden visas were about a thousand a year, against 150,000 to 180,000 sales9, 26. The share of non-residents fell to 5.0% of sales in 2025, the year of the biggest price risesecondary.
  • Reading: it weighed more in the second half of the 2010s and in the top segments. Today it weighs less than people say.

5. Immigration

  • For: the foreign population went from about 0.42 million (2017) to 1.54 million (2024)5, 6. Banco de Portugal attributes the deficit of about 300,000 homes mainly to population and household growth through immigration16. Foreign residents gained weight in purchases (28% with foreign nationality) and in lending (13.56%)43, 45. Rents rose 42% between 2020 and 20249, 48.
  • Against: between 2005 and 2009 the foreign population rose 65% with real prices falling1, 5. In 2025 the inflow fell to less than half and prices accelerated46, 2. The series were revised and cannot be compared over time without caution.
  • Reading: immigration is a demand shock like the others. It weighs where supply does not respond, and it weighs first on rents and overcrowding. It did not weigh on prices when there was construction.

6. Wages and income

  • For (as a brake): almost flat real wages between 2002 and 2017 limited borrowing and help explain why there was no bubble in the 2000s23.
  • Against (as an engine): prices have risen far more than wages since 2015. The average net wage in 2025 was 1,282 euros24; the minimum wage rose 72% between 2015 and 2025 (505 to 870 euros)22calculation; the nominal price index rose 164%2calculation.
  • Reading: Portuguese income is no longer what sets the price of homes in the most sought-after places. That points to buyers with income from abroad, long loans or accumulated savings; I have not yet been able to separate these three.

7. Public policy

  • On the demand side (subsidised credit until 2002, golden visas, non-habitual residents, public guarantee and youth IMT exemption in 2024): these coincide with more buying, and in the case of young buyers in 2025 with a price acceleration. João Amador's study concludes that policy should focus above all on the capacity of supply to respond; the press summarised it as "the crisis cannot be solved with demand-side policies"42.
  • On the supply and use side (urban renovation, short-term rental containment, Mais Habitação): small or ambiguous measured effects. Short-term rental containment made works fall in the treated parishes32 and did not return homes to housing39.

8. Geography: where demand is concentrated

For: Banco de Portugal concludes that the housing problem does not come from a general lack of urban land, but from the concentration of demand in areas where land is scarce73. Vacant homes point the same way: the rate is highest where demand is lowest (17.4% in Alto Alentejo and Médio Tejo)12. Between 2017 and 2025, prices more than doubled in 157 municipalities, with the biggest rises in Lisbon's periphery73.

Against: Grande Lisboa has 11.1% vacant homes, almost the national average12: even where demand is tight there are homes off the market. And in 2026 the fastest rises are in sub-regions such as Médio Tejo and Lezíria, where land is not lacking47.

Reading: the housing shortage is local, not national. This resolves a good part of the contradiction between the estimated deficit and the 723,000 empty homes: many of the empty ones are where nobody is looking. Demand that does not fit in the centre spreads outwards in waves, and the price follows.

The common pattern

Across the five blocks a sequence repeats: when construction was high, demand and credit shocks did not pass into prices; since construction fell to a tenth and then a quarter of its peak, all of them have. The question this reading leaves open is why supply did not come back: labour shortages (80,000 to 100,000 workers, according to the sector49), slow permitting, land costs, taxes (up to 40% of the cost, according to developers49), or existing homes that do not come onto the market. I did not get as far as measuring these factors.

What Banco de Portugal adds (June 2026)

The special study in the June Economic Bulletin partly answers the question left above73:

  • Labour was the main obstacle: about 30% of firms pointed to it between 2022 and 2024. Immigration eased it: foreigners went from 10% (2019) to 32% (2025) of construction workers.
  • The sector's capital fell about 30% in real terms between 2010 and 2017 and, in 2023, was still 20% below 2010.
  • The cost of building a new home rose 36% between 2019 and 2025: first materials (+27% up to 2022), then wages (+7.6% a year between 2022 and 2025).
  • The sector's margins are at their highest since 2006: builders managed to pass costs into the price, especially in the more expensive segments.
  • 98% of firms are micro or small; slow and unpredictable permitting and a lack of land complete the list.

The same study rules out two popular explanations. Prices and rents rose together (about 88% and 81% per square metre between 2017 and 2024), and consumers' expectations are in line with the actual rise: Banco de Portugal reads this as a market driven by fundamentals, not by a bubble73. And credit followed prices instead of pushing them: the weight of credit in the value of sales stayed below 60%, close to 2019, and the municipalities that rose most were not those that relied most on credit73.

A note on timing: Banco de Portugal estimates that the gap between new homes and new households, about 300,000 over a decade, closed in 2025 as a flow, with less immigration and more permits (41,900 homes permitted, the highest since 2008)73. The accumulated shortfall does not disappear; what stops growing is the hole. If the reading is right, demographic pressure on prices eases from 2026.

Claims that circulate

Six claims we left out

Claims that circulate about housing and that the data does not confirm.

There are 723,000 empty homes, so there is no shortage.Incomplete

The 723,215 vacant homes in the 2021 Census exist12, but only some of them are for sale or rent and in good condition: 154,075 according to INE and LNEC12, 236,927 according to IHRU93secondary. And many are where nobody is looking for a home.

See chapters 8 and 9 →
Foreigners buy 28% of homes.It counts something else

The 28% are buyers of foreign nationality, resident in Portugal or not43. Buyers with tax residence outside the country were 5.0% of sales in 2025 (INE).

See chapters 6 and 9 →
Golden visas pushed prices up.Exaggerated

They brought about 2% to 3% of the value of a year's sales62calculation and pushed up the price of homes around 500,000 euros by more than 10%67. Prices kept rising after the property route ended in 2023.

See chapter 6 →
It's a bubble and it will burst.Not confirmed

Prices and rents rose together, families' expectations follow the actual rise and credit followed prices instead of pushing them. Banco de Portugal reads this as scarcity, not a bubble73.

See chapter 10 →
Short-term rentals took homes away from the Portuguese.True in one neighbourhood, not in the country

In Santa Maria Maior, family homes fell 28% in a decade31, 34. At national scale, short-term rentals are about 2% of homes12, 40calculation, and the cancellation of thousands of registrations in Lisbon did not return homes to housing39.

See chapter 5 →
Lisbon and Porto are where supply responds least.A misreading of a study

That is how the press summarised João Amador's study. In the study, Lisbon has the highest supply elasticity in the country and Sintra the smallest effect of demand on prices42.

See chapter 9 →

For families

What this means for anyone buying or renting today

The chapters tell how we got here. This part looks at today's market, in November 2026, and at what a family can do with it.

Choosing where

  1. What weighs most on the price of a home where you want to live is how much is built there relative to the households arriving. Demand-side support helps people get in, but it does not increase the number of homes.
  2. Before choosing a municipality, check how many new homes are permitted and completed there: INE publishes this by municipality every year76. According to João Amador's study, the same rise in demand weighs less on the price where supply responds more42.
  3. The periphery is cheaper: in Q2 2026, a square metre in Península de Setúbal cost about 42% less than in the municipality of Lisbon, and rent about 33% less96, 101calculation. But that is where prices have risen most since 2017. Add the cost and time of commuting to the mortgage or rent.
  4. In the Algarve and central Lisbon, the price is partly set by people buying with income from abroad. Measure the home in years of your salary, not just in euros: 90 m² costs 15.3 years of average earnings in the Algarve and 8.5 nationally (chapter 8). The end of golden visas for property, in 2023, did not bring prices down.
  5. In the historic centres of Lisbon and Porto there are few homes to live in, and the short-term rental cancellations did not bring them back39. Compare medians by parish, which INE publishes for both cities96, 101.

Buying

  1. Simulate the loan at today's Euribor plus one percentage point: it is the kind of shock Banco de Portugal already applies when calculating the debt-service ratio94. In 2007 Euribor got close to 4.5%, and many families who had bought at low rates saw their payments rise.
  2. Since August 2026, the maximum recommended debt-service ratio is 45% of income94. It is a ceiling, not a target: a payment of up to 35% to 40% leaves room for rates to rise.
  3. Young people up to 35: the public guarantee allows up to 100% of the home to be financed, but it only covers deeds signed by 31 December 202698. The exemption from IMT and stamp duty is total up to 330,539 euros90. The guarantee solves the lack of a deposit, not a lack of income: the payment still has to fit the budget. Banco de Portugal links this support to the 2025 price rise100.
  4. Divide the asking price by the area and compare it with INE's median for the municipality or parish96, 101. It is the simplest way to know whether you are paying above the local market.

Renting

  1. Today, the deposit is limited to two months' rent and the landlord can only oppose the first renewal after three years of contract89. A pending government review may change these rules: check the law in force before signing.
  2. In 2027 rent can rise by at most 2.56%, if the contract has no other rule, and the landlord must give written notice at least 30 days in advance99.
  3. Make sure the contract is registered with the tax authority: it is a condition for Porta 65 Jovem, which takes applications all year round, and for the extraordinary rent support97.
  4. If the landlord refuses necessary repairs, the Tenant and Landlord Office has a dedicated summary procedure for the tenant95.

Reading the news

  1. When you read that "so many homes are missing" or that "foreigners buy so much", ask what was counted: new homes or existing homes, residents or non-residents, the country or your region. Chapter 9 shows how the answer changes.

Test

How much does a home cost where you live?

Choose the region, the size of the home and, if you like, your salary. The test does the sums with the numbers in this analysis. Nothing you type leaves your screen.

Median sale price per m² in 2025 (INE), median rent of new contracts in Q2 2026 (INE), average monthly earnings in 2024 (Quadros de Pessoal, 14 payments), new homes and households from the 2011 and 2021 Censuses. Median values: the specific home you are looking for may cost more or less.

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Method

How I did this analysis

Prices

BIS quarterly series for Portugal (nominal and real) and Spain (real), read quarter by quarter; annual averages and changes calculated here. Implied inflation is the ratio between the nominal and the real index.

Interest rates

12-month Euribor, average of the twelve months of each year, from Banco de España's monthly table reproduced in4.

Construction, sales, renovation, rents

INE annual and quarterly reports opened during the research (2013, 2016, 2020 and 2022 editions and Q4 2025), plus news reports citing INE when the report could not be opened.

Foreign population

PORDATA series (INE and SEF/AIMA) from 2000 to 2023 and the AIMA report for 2024.

Short-term rentals and renovation

national register (via the press), two Ministry of the Economy studies, a study for the parish councils of the historic centre, an academic article on Alfama, a Técnico dissertation and the Nova SBE study.

What is mine

The regional test (new homes for each new household, by region and municipality), the cross-check of prices against the weight of buyers from abroad, the four regional portraits, the years of salary for 90 m² and the table of the weight of each factor in each block are my own synthesis. They rest on public data from INE, Banco de Portugal and the BIS, but they do not exist in this form in any of the sources.

Interests

I trained estate agents and property finders in real-estate marketing and sales; they used the training as continuing education to renew the estate agency licence until 2013. I still work with the sector as a consultant, in sales and marketing. No organisation funded this analysis.

The limits of this analysis
  1. Prices before 2009 rest mainly on bank valuations, not on deeds.
  2. Completed homes are INE estimates, revised from edition to edition.
  3. Immigration: the counts changed criteria and were revised; numbers from different years are not directly comparable.
  4. Credit: Banco de Portugal has several series, with and without renegotiations; I could not read BPstat directly.
  5. Short-term rentals: the national register held tens of thousands of inactive registrations until 2025; the Census does not count short-term rentals.
  6. Causality: most of this analysis shows coincidences in time. Only the studies on Airbnb38, short-term rental containment32 and demand elasticity42 use methods that try to isolate causes, and all have stated limits.
  7. Sources with an interest in the subject: property developers49, a residents' association39 and the short-term rental association (cited in40) have stated positions. Their numbers are identified as such.
Where the thesis is weak
  • Spain built a lot in the 2000s and had a bubble. The construction numbers (a peak of 658,510 homes in 200685) show that the Spanish peak came at the end of the bubble and the Portuguese one in 2002. Building a lot only holds prices back when credit is not out of proportion.
  • Between 2020 and 2025 construction rose and prices accelerated. This is consistent with the thesis (the level stayed at a quarter of the peak, and the accumulated shortfall cannot be made up in five years), but it is not yet shown with numbers.
  • The decisive test was done and the thesis passed: between the 2011 and 2021 Censuses, Grande Lisboa, Península de Setúbal, Grande Porto and the Algarve gained 74% of the country's new households and received 34% of its new homes (chapter 8). Two caveats remain: the municipality of Porto built more than it gained in households, and in the Algarve the weight of second homes counts as much as the lack of construction.
  • João Amador's study measures how supply responds to price and puts Lisbon among the municipalities that reacted most between 2017 and 2024. It does not contradict the regional test (they are different measures), but it forces the thesis to be sharpened: Lisbon's problem is the level of construction against new households, not a lack of reaction to price.
  • IHRU reads the same Censuses the other way round: there are more homes than households in every municipality. A vacant home off the market is not supply (chapter 9, point 11).

Sources

101 sources, in the order they appear

Numbers marked calculation are my own sums on the source given; secondary means I read the number in a news report or another study, not in the original.

Academicpeer-reviewed journal, working paper or study with a published methodOfficialofficial statistics, public body, law or central bankAnalystconsultancy, commercial bank or market research firmAssociationassociation, observatory or organisation with a position on the subjectPressnewspaper, magazine or news siteEssayopinion piece, blog or popular writing
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  40. 40
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  42. 42
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  44. 44
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  49. 49
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  50. 50
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    OfficialDecree-Law 39/2008 of 7 March, and Decree-Law 128/2014 of 29 August (short-term rentals).open ↗
  87. 87
    OfficialDecree-Law 249/2009 of 23 September (Investment Tax Code; non-habitual resident regime).
  88. 88
    OfficialINE, Dormidas nos alojamentos turísticos coletivos (indicador 0002944).open ↗
  89. 89
    OfficialLaw 56/2023 of 6 October (Mais Habitação).open ↗
  90. 90
    OfficialDecree-Law 48-A/2024 of 25 July (IMT and stamp duty exemption for young buyers).open ↗
  91. 91
    OfficialLaw 2/2024, de 5 de janeiro, Programa Nacional de Habitação 2022–2026, annex, section I (Tables 1, 3, 5 and 6).open ↗
  92. 92
    Pressidealista, Há excedente de casas em Portugal, mas há assimetria e faltam obras (IHRU, Report on Residential Renting, 2023).open ↗
  93. 93
    PressJN, Há 250 mil casas prontas a habitar que estão fora do mercado (IHRU, Territories with Lacking or Inadequate Housing Supply, 2025).open ↗
  94. 94
    OfficialBanco de Portugal, Recomendação Macroprudencial n.º 1/2026 and press release (debt-service ratio, LTV and maturity, from 1 August 2026).open ↗
  95. 95
    OfficialTribunais, Balcão do Arrendatário e do Senhorio (NRAU, art. 15.º-A; Ordinance 49/2024).open ↗
  96. 96
    PressRenascença, Renda mediana de novos contratos sobe 10,2% para 10,17 euros/m² (INE, local rents, Q2 2026).open ↗
  97. 97
    OfficialPortal da Habitação, Porta 65 Jovem.open ↗
  98. 98
    OfficialDecree-Law 44/2024 of 10 July (public guarantee for young buyers); Jornal Económico, Garantia do Estado já consumiu 56% da verba (Banco de Portugal, July 2026).open ↗
  99. 99
    OfficialINE, Notice no. 24199/2026/2, Diário da República, series 2, 1 October 2026 (rent update coefficient for 2027)secondary: read in legal sources.
  100. 100
    OfficialBanco de Portugal, Acompanhamento das medidas macroprudenciais em Portugal, March 2026.open ↗
  101. 101
    PressObservador, Preços das casas subiram 18,4% no segundo trimestre (INE, local prices, Q2 2026).open ↗

Portugal is not short of homes. It is short of homes where people want to live.

Talk to Nelson

Analysis No. 5 · November 2026 · Nelson Viegas · Superior Training Technology

Illustrative example

NAPA diagnosis — a commercial-leadership role

Based on a real report. Shows the reading by domain for the role, not the diagnosis’ full numeric values.

Revenue Strategy & PredictabilityStrong
KPIs & Revenue PerformanceConsolidating
Customer JourneyTo assess
Sales LeadershipTo develop
Leadership & TeamTo develop
Stakeholder OrchestrationTo develop
Negotiation & PartnershipsTo develop

The same domains, as a radar chart

Current levelRole requirement
RevenueStrategyKPIs &PerformanceCustomerJourneySalesLeadershipLeadership &TeamOrchestrationNegotiation
Diagnosis by domain, current level and role requirement
DomainCurrent levelRole requirement
Revenue Strategy & Predictability8885
KPIs & Revenue Performance6480
Customer Journey5070
Sales Leadership3685
Leadership & Team3875
Stakeholder Orchestration3480
Negotiation & Partnerships3378